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TO: [ ] INFO [ ]

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

FROM: C/E/OPS INFO: E/G

SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF ALIAS ACKERMANN ON CLANDESTINE WARNING  
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 586531

1. FURTHER TO REFERENCE, FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SUBJECT  
BRIEFING WHICH ANIO/WARNING [ ] GAVE TO ACKERMANN AND  
LOCAL CASCOPE SENIOR REP ROSENLEHNER AT HQS ON 1 JUNE. WE ARE USING  
TEAR LINE FORMAT TO FACILITATE PASSAGE TO ACKERMANN AFTER HIS RETURN  
TO MUNICH, PER HIS REQUEST. OPS COMMENTS TO ASSIST [ ] IN  
FUTURE WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGE.

-----TEAR LINE-----  
2. ON THE OCCASION OF ACKERMANN'S 1 JUNE 1983 VISIT TO HQS,  
DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE BETWEEN US OF OUR CURRENT THINKING IN RESPECT  
TO THE COLLECTION OF SOME KINDS OF WARNING INTELLIGENCE FROM HUMAN  
SOURCES. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS IN THE PRESENTATION OF  
THIS SUBJECT MADE TO ACKERMANN BY [ ] ASSISTANT  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING.

3. WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE CATEGORIES OF  
"WARNING OF WAR" AND "WARNING OF ATTACK", DEFINING EACH CATEGORY AS  
FOLLOWS:

A. WARNING OF WAR IS AN INTELLIGENCE JUDGEMENT CLEARLY  
CONVEYED TO NATIONAL DECISIONMAKERS AND TO MILITARY COMMANDERS THAT A  
COUNTRY HAS COMMENCED STEPS TO ENABLE IT TO CONDUCT WAR IN THE NEAR  
FUTURE AND IS ON A COURSE, WHICH IF UNALTERED, WILL LEAD TO WAR.

B. WARNING OF ATTACK IS AN INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENT THAT A  
COUNTRY INTENDS TO LAUNCH A MILITARY ATTACK ACROSS ITS BORDERS. THE  
JUDGEMENT ATTEMPTS TO ESTIMATE AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE THE TIMING,  
LOCATION AND FORCE OF THE ATTACK.

4. ANOTHER WAY OF EXPRESSING THIS DISTINCTION IS TO SAY THAT  
"NATIONS GO TO WAR, WHILE ARMIES ATTACK." A CORROLARY DISTINCTION IS  
THAT THE NATIONAL DECISION TO GO TO WAR SETS IN TRAIN A VARIETY OF  
EVENTS, NOT ALL OF WHICH HAVE A PRIMARILY MILITARY CHARACTER.  
ATTACK, HOWEVER, IS BY ITS NATURE A MILITARY ACTION, TO BE ASSOCIATED

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WITH EXTERNALS (INDICATORS) PRIMARILY OF A MILITARY NATURE, E.G. MOVEMENT OF FORCES, DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS.

5. OUR THINKING ALLOCATES TO WARNING OF WAR IMPORTANT COLLECTION MISSIONS FOR HUMAN SOURCES. WHILE HUMAN SOURCE REPORTING IS ALSO PERTINENT TO THE SECOND CATEGORY OF WARNING OF ATTACK, THESE INDICATORS CAN AND ARE BEING REPORTED BY TECHNICAL MEANS. BY EMPHASIZING WARNING OF WAR COLLECTION FOR CLANDESTINE COLLECTION WE SEE AS POTENTIAL BENEFITS:

A. WAR (AS CONTRASTED TO ATTACK) INDICATORS OCCUR BY DEFINITION EARLY IN THE SEQUENCE OF PREPARATIONS BY THE AGGRESSOR. THEIR PROMPT DETECTION PROVIDES MAXIMUM NOTICE TO NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES AND PERMITS CUEING (OR TASKING) TECHNICAL COLLECTION MEANS AGAINST TARGETS ON A HIGHER PRIORITY BASIS THAN CUSTOMARY.

B. ATTACK INDICATORS ARE OFTEN AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE ACTIONS WHICH MILITARY FORCES FREQUENTLY EXERCISE AND REHEARSE, THUS POSING TO ANALYSTS THE CHALLENGE OF DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN POSSIBLY ROUTINE MANEUVERS AND IMMINENT HOSTILITIES. THOSE INDICATORS OF WAR, HOWEVER, WHICH ARISE FROM THE TRANSITIONING TO A WARTIME FOOTING OF NORMALLY CIVILIAN SECTORS AND FACILITIES WILL BE LESS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT ROUTINELY EXERCISED AND REHEARSED IN AN ECONOMY OR A SOCIETY. CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN WE BEGIN TO DETECT THEM, THEY IMMEDIATELY ACQUIRE A GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.

6. FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR THINKING ABOUT THE COLLECTION OF WAR INDICATORS BY HUMAN SOURCES IS THE EXPECTATION THAT A NATIONAL DECISION TO GO TO WAR WILL BE REFLECTED IN A VARIETY OF DISLOCATIONS IN THE PEACETIME STATUS QUO, WHICH DISLOCATIONS MAY PRECEDE BY MANY WEEKS THE MILITARY INDICATORS OF INCIPIENT ARMED ATTACK. WE HAVE DEVELOPED THE VIEW THAT SUSTAINED AND SYSTEMATIC MONITORING/OBSERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN SELECTED SECTORS OF AN ADVERSARY'S TERRITORY AND ECONOMIC LIFE IS NECESSARY TO THE CAPABILITY WE NEED TO DETECT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT THE DISRUPTION IN NORMAL RHYTHMS INDICATIVE OF THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT RANDOM, SPASMODIC CRISIS-GENERATED REPORTING OF ANOMALIES BY UNTRAINED, VOLUNTEER REPORTERS IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR EMPLACEMENT OF AN AGENT-BASED MONITORING SYSTEM IN ADVANCE OF CRISES. SUCH A MECHANISM WOULD SERVE THE KEY OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING BENCHMARKS FOR NORMAL ROUTINES IN PEACETIME, THIS BEING THE DATA BASE AGAINST WHICH THE SAME OBSERVERS/COLLECTORS WOULD BE PRIMED TO DETECT AND REPORT DEPARTURES FROM THE STATUS QUO.

7. WHILE OUR OWN ANALYSIS OF THESE MATTERS IS FAR FROM COMPLETE, THE VISIT OF ACKERMANN PROMPTED US TO DEVELOP A DEMONSTRATION OF HOW WE MIGHT APPLY THIS WARNING OF WAR APPROACH TO A SPECIFIC ECONOMIC SECTOR AND WE CHOSE FOR THAT DEMONSTRATION WARSAW PACT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS. WE DEVELOPED THE HYPOTHESIS THAT A NUMBER DEMONSTRATION, WE DEVELOPED THE HYPOTHESIS THAT A NUMBER UNSPECIFIED, BUT IN THE RANGE OF 25-50) OF PERSONS WITH ROUTINE AND

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RECURRING (ON THE ORDER OF 3-5 TRIPS PER YEAR) TRAVEL PATTERNS IN EAST GERMANY AND OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES HAD AGREED TO REPORT AFTER EACH TRIP SOME OF THEIR OBSERVATIONS AND EXPERIENCES. WERE SUCH AN INVENTORY OF OBSERVERS AVAILABLE TO US, WE WOULD EXPECT THEM OVER TIME TO PROVIDE US WITH A DATA BASE FOR THE NORM IN RESPECT TO THESE FOLLOWING KINDS OF PHENOMENA.

8. MILITARY CONTROL OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION. MILITARY USE AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF WARSAW PACT SURFACE (ROAD, RAIL AND WATERWAY) COMMUNICATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO TRANSITION TO HIGHER AND MORE VISIBLE LEVELS IN THE WAKE OF A DECISION TO PREPARE FOR WAR AND IN ADVANCE OF A FORMAL CLOSURE OF NATIONAL BORDERS. AN EXPERIENCED USER AND OBSERVER OF THESE FACILITIES WOULD BE ABLE IN THIS TRANSITION TIME TO NOTE INCREASED OR ALTERED (IN COMPARISON TO LEVELS HE HAD ESTABLISHED AS THE NORM):

A. VISIBILITY OF SOVIET MILITARY TRANSPORTATION AGENCY PERSONNEL (VOSO) AND OPERATING STAFFS ON EAST EUROPEAN RAILWAYS, ROLLING STOCK AND AT MARSHALLING YARDS.

B. PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY NATIONAL MILITARY UNIFORMED FORCES.

C. PROCEDURES AT SWITCHING POINTS AND BORDER AND INTERNAL CHECKPOINTS.

C. PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT OF ROLLING STOCK FROM RAILROAD YARDS IN WESTERN PORTIONS OF FORWARD AREAS.

WE WOULD SUGGEST FOCUS FOR THIS KIND OF COLLECTION BE TARGET AREAS REPRESENTED BY THE RAIL CORRIDORS FROM WEST GERMANY TO WEST BERLIN AND THE MITTELLAND-ELBE-HAVELCANAL SYSTEMS.

(NOTE: THESE AND LATER GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCES IN THIS PAPER ARE ILLUSTRATIVE ONLY AND NOT MEANT TO IMPLY THAT THESE AREAS WOULD BE THOSE ON WHICH ACTUAL COLLECTION COULD OR WOULD BE TARGETTED.)

9. MOBILIZATION OF REAR SERVICE ENTITIES, E.G. RAILROAD TROOPS. SUCH TROOPS NORMALLY REMAIN CLOSE TO GARRISON AND DEPARTURE FROM PATTERNS WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT WAR WARNING INDICATOR. SIMULTANEOUS SIGHTINGS FROM SEVERAL INDEPENDENT AND EXPERIENCED OBSERVERS OF RAILROAD TROOPS: (A) ON NORMAL ROUTES, (B) PREPARING TEMPORARY BRIDGEWORK NEAR RIVERS, (C) STOCKPILING MATERIALS OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL AREA OF RADIUS, (D) ABSENT FROM THEIR CUSTOMARY GARRISON LOCATIONS WOULD HAVE HIGH VALUE TO WARNING ASSESSMENTS. WE WOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING AREAS AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THOSE WHICH MIGHT BE MOST PRODUCTIVE IN A SYSTEMATIC HUMINT WARNING COLLECTION PROGRAM: ANNABURG, DDR; MIEDZYRZECZ, POLAND; BRETTIN, DDR; WALDREHNA, DDR.

10. ASSEMBLY OF ROLLING STOCK. OBSERVED DEPARTURES FROM THE NORM OF THE QUANTITIES OF FLATCARS IN YARDS AT FRANKFURT/ODER AND COTTBUS-FORST/LAUSITZ WOULD HAVE WARNING SIGNIFICANCE. ASSEMBLIES OF LARGER THAN USUAL AGGREGATES OF UNLOADED FLATCARS IS A PHENOMENON WE ASSOCIATE WITH WARNING OF WAR.

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11. MOBILIZATION OF AVTOKOLONNAS (RESERVE MOTOR TRANSPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT). TRANSITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSPORT TO PRE-WAR FOOTING WILL ENTAIL WITHDRAWAL OF CIVILIAN VEHICLES FROM THEIR NORMAL ROUTES AND THEIR INTEGRATION INTO OTHERWISE MILITARY CONVOYS. EXPERIENCED OBSERVERS WITH RECURRING ACCESS TO AREAS SUCH AS ZWICKAU, LEIPZIG\* SWIDINCA, GDYNIA AND POZNAN WOULD BE MOST APT TO DETECT THIS TYPE OF TRANSITION IN AN EARLY STAGE.

12. GENERAL SECURITY AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES. THIS IS A LARGE CATEGORY OF INDICATORS, EMBRACING MANY PHENOMENA ACCESSIBLE TO TRAVELERS IN THE BLOC. FOR EXAMPLE, THE POSTING OF GUARDS AT BRIDGES (WHERE NONE HAD NORMALLY BEEN OBSERVED), ERECTION OF DETOURS ON MAIN AND SECONDARY ARTERIES, THE APPEARANCE OF ROVING ARMED PATROLS, TIGHTER CONTROLS AND SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGN TRAVEL WITHIN THE AREA, AD HOC CHECKPOINTS ARE EVENTS/OBSERVATIONS WHICH, IF REPORTED BY MORE THAN A FEW SOURCES AND IN A COMPRESSED PERIOD OF TIME, COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE WARNING SIGNIFICANCE. WE WOULD ATTACH HIGHEST VALUE TO OBSERVERS WITH ROUTINE, RECURRING ACCESS TO THE BRIDGES OVER THE ELBE AND VISTULA RIVERS AND TO THE FOLLOWING SURFACE TRAVEL CORRIDORS:

KALINGRAD-GDANSK-SZCZECIN  
GRODNO-TORUN-BYDGOSZCZ-SZCZECIN  
BREST-WARSAW-POZNAN-FRANKFURT  
CHELM-LUBLIN-LODZ-ZIELONA GORA  
LVOV-KRAKOW-WROCLAW-COTTBUS

13. DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE REPAIR ELEMENTS. OBSERVERS WITH RECURRING ACCESS TO EICHHOLZ, OSTRITZ, AND LEIPZIG WOULD BE ABLE TO DOCUMENT THE NORM OF ACTIVITY IN AREAS HOUSING KEY VEHICLE REPAIR DEPOTS. ANOMALIES IN ACTIVITIES (E.G. ABSENCE FROM GARRISON, REDUCTION OF REPAIR BACKLOGS) ARE ANTICIPATED TO OCCUR IN AFTERMATH OF DECISION FOR WAR AND IN ADVANCE OF DECISION TO ATTACK.

14. FOREGOING THOUGHTS ON SUBJECT OF HUMINT COLLECTION OF WARNING OF WAR ARE EXPLORATORY AND TENTATIVE. IT NEEDS TO BE STRESSED THAT THE BRIEFING FOCUSSED ON ONLY ONE AREA FOR PURPOSES OF DEMONSTRATION AND THAT, EVEN IN THAT SINGLE AREA, IT IS FAR FROM EXHAUSTIVE. ADDITIONAL AND MUCH GREATER RESEARCH WOULD BE CALLED FOR BEFORE REQUIREMENTS COULD BE REFINED FOR TASKING OF ACTUAL SOURCES. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR SERVICES WOULD BE TO OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT. WE NOTE THAT ACKERMANN ALSO INDICATED INTEREST IN CONTINUING THESE DISCUSSIONS AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH HE SAID WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO IDENTIFY ROADWAYS AND WATERWAYS IN EAST GERMANY AND OTHER BLOC AREAS WHICH ARE REGULARLY TRANSITTED BY WESTERN USERS.

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